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I. INTRODUCTION 
The traditional division of law into private and public has faded 
away in many jurisdictions across the globe, already for several dec-
ades. The Republic of Argentina is no exception to that phenome-
non, since private and public law cannot be considered watertight 
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compartments. This report addresses the interplay of private and 
public law in that South American country. It focusses on develop-
ments that deal with the adoption of a national civil and commercial 
code (Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, ACCC) on August 1, 
2015,1 while elaborating on two pillars of private law that serve as 
examples of the referred interplay, namely the law of family and the 
law of property. As this report aims to demonstrate, these develop-
ments are interconnected and reflect paradigmatic shifts in the un-
derstanding of the law by scholars, courts, and society at large. 
The current context welcomes a frequent interplay of private and 
public law in Argentina. Constitutional law in this South American 
country includes the Argentine Constitution and a selection of 
human rights treaties.2 The Argentine Constitution contains the 
value premises under which Argentine society is formed. Human 
rights treaties, incorporated in the Argentine Constitution in 1994,3 
 
 1. See Law 26994, available at https://perma.cc/Z26Y-TWHE.  
 On the path towards the adoption of the new Argentine text, see Julieta Ma-
rotta & Agustín Parise, On Codes, Marriage, and Access to Justice: Recent De-
velopments in the Law of Argentina, 7 J. CIV. L. STUD. 237 (2014); and Agustín 
Parise, The Argentine Civil and Commercial Code (2015): Igniting a Third Gen-
eration of Codes for Latin America, 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES 
PRIVATRECHT 639 (2017). 
 2. This paragraph borrows part of its exposition, sometimes drawing verba-
tim, from JULIETA MAROTTA, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF 
VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE THROUGH LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CITY 
OF BUENOS AIRES: A QUALITATIVE EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDY 44-45 (Boekenplan 
Maastricht 2017). 
 3. See National Constitution of the Republic of Argentina, available at 
https://perma.cc/DVK7-UENZ [hereinafter Const. Nacional]; the English transla-
tion of art. 75(22) reads as follows: 
Congress is empowered: 
. . . . 
22. To approve or reject treaties concluded with other nations and inter-
national organizations, and concordats with the Holy See. Treaties and 
concordats have a higher hierarchy than laws. The American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man; the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights; the American Convention on Human Rights; the International 
Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Pact on 
Civil and Political Rights and its empowering Protocol; the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide; the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Woman; the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 




recognize and extend rights to the people.4 They also increase the 
international responsibility of the State to, on the one hand, 
implement policies to ensure the recognition of fundamental rights 
and proper prevention on latent social problems; and, on the other 
hand, to examine, adjudicate, and compensate for the violation of 
rights.5 Indeed, policy decisions at an international and 
constitutional level may color the subsequent legal provisions that 
have to comply with this legal threshold.6  
II. BLURRING DIVIDE 
The interplay of private and public law is sensed in many aspects 
of the Argentine legal framework.7 A recent example is present in 
the ACCC, and is made palpable in the exposé des motifs by the 
drafters of that new code of private law. The nineteenth-century 
commercial (1862) and civil (1871) codes had undergone extensive 
 
Degrading Treatments or Punishments; the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child; in the full force of their provisions, they have constitutional 
hierarchy, do no repeal any section of the First Part of this Constitution 
and are to be understood as complementing the rights and guarantees 
recognized herein. They shall only be denounced, in such event, by the 
National Executive Power after the approval of two-thirds of all the 
members of each House. In order to attain constitutional hierarchy, the 
other treaties and conventions on human rights shall require the vote of 
two-thirds of all the members of each House, after their approval by Con-
gress. 
 4. The Argentine Constitution incorporates human rights treaties ranking at 
the same level than the Constitution itself. In addition, it establishes the procedure 
for further approval of international treaties. Human rights treaties that do not rank 
at the constitutional level are anyway above federal law. See MARÍA ANGÉLICA 
GELLI, CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA NACIÓN ARGENTINA: COMENTADA Y CONCORDADA 
591-597 (2d ed., La Ley 2004). 
 5. GENERAL SECRETARIAT ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE FOR WOMEN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS § 15, 33 (2007). 
See also Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights 1988; and art. 7, Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punish-
ment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, available at 
https://perma.cc/5BVJ-L5G6. 
 6. MICHAEL J. HILL, THE PUBLIC POLICY PROCESS 160 (6th ed., 
Routledge 2013). 
 7. This section borrows part of its exposition, sometimes drawing verbatim, 
from Parise, supra note 1. 




revision and had been subject to de-codification; while re-codifica-
tion efforts were launched since the 1980s, aiming to unify civil and 
commercial law in a single fabric.8 Resilience is a characteristic of 
codification: codes are indeed able to adapt to different societal 
needs at different times and places.9 Further, codes can be deemed 
fundamental corpora that shape law and society, and changes were 
introduced to the Argentine legal framework by means of the adop-
tion of the long-awaited ACCC. 
The drafters of the ACCC refer in their exposé des motifs to a 
number of tenets that are present in the new text.10 A tenet that is 
closely connected to the fading divide of private and public law re-
fers to a code that acknowledges the constitutionalization of private 
law.11 The ACCC offers a community between private law and pub-
lic law, especially with the Argentine Constitution.12 For example, 
as this report aims to demonstrate, the new code offers articulation 
between public and private law in the areas of family and property. 
Further, the articulation is sensed between a public law system that 
defends human rights and equality and a private law system of con-
tract law that offers adequate consumer protection.13 This commu-
nity of systems has long been sought for by a number of Argentine 
 
 8. See Marotta & Parise, supra note 1, at 239-250. 
 9. Agustín Parise & Lars van Vliet, Preface, in RE- DE- CO-DIFICATION? 
NEW INSIGHTS ON THE CODIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW vii, ix (Agustín Parise & 
Lars van Vliet eds. 2018). 
 10. See the complete text of the exposé des motifs in Fundamentos del Ante-
proyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, especially at 4-6, available 
at https://perma.cc/2TG8-TK7W [hereinafter, Fundamentos del Anteproyecto]. 
See also Augusto C. Belluscio, Le Code civil et commercial argentin de 2014 
(Aperçu général et droit des personnes et de la famille), 3 REVUE INTERNATIO-
NALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 663 (2015). 
 11. Julio César Rivera, La constitucionalización del derecho privado en el 
proyecto de código civil y comercial, in COMENTARIOS AL PROYECTO DE CÓDIGO 
CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN 2012 1, 8 (Julio César Rivera ed. 2012). 
 12. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 4. See Rivera, supra 
note 11, at 8; and Miriam Smayevsky & Marcela A. Penna, Los derechos reales 
en el siglo XXI, LA LEY 1, 4 (April 10, 2015). 
 13. Miguel Carlos Araya, El contenido del derecho comercial a partir del 
Código Civil y Comercial, LA LEY 1, 3-4 (Apr. 20, 2015); and Eduardo M. Favier 
Dubois, La “autonomía” y los contenidos del Derecho Comercial a partir del 
Código unificado, LA LEY 1, 8 (Feb. 2, 2015). 




scholars.14 The exposé des motifs states along those lines that “it 
may be affirmed that a reconstruction of the coherence of the human 
rights system with private law exists.”15 A number of provisions of 
the ACCC, therefore, find grounding in the Argentine Constitution 
and in supranational law.16 The ACCC accordingly indicates that 
“the situations ruled by this code must be resolved according to the 
applicable laws, according to the Argentine Constitution, and to the 
human rights treaties subscribed by Argentina.”17 Furthermore, the 
ACCC notes that “the law must be interpreted according to the letter, 
the aims, the analogous laws, the dispositions that derive from hu-
man rights treaties, the juridical principles and values, in a way that 
is coherent with the entire system.”18 The constitutionalization of 
private law and the incorporation of international treaties into the 
Argentine Constitution had had an impact in domestic law,19 and the 
ACCC aims to make that scenario explicit in its provisions. The Ar-
gentine Constitution is now at the center of the system, and—as 
mentioned before—a selection of treaties have become part of the 
internal system.20 The ACCC aims to adapt the civil and commercial 
law to the Argentine Constitution and to supranational human 
rights.21 Thus, the new text places all human beings at the center, 
protecting all people regardless of their condition, and is able to con-
stitutionalize civil and commercial law according to the human 
rights that were included in the 1994 constitutional reform.22  
 
 14. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 4.  
 15. Id. See Rivera, supra note 11, at 8. 
 16. Rivera, supra note 11, at 21. 
 17. Law 26994, art. 1. 
 18. Id. at art. 2. See Héctor P. Recalde et al., Precisiones sobre el Código 
Civil y Comercial y el Derecho Laboral, LA LEY 1, 1 (Nov. 10, 2014). 
 19. Elena I. Highton, Los jóvenes o adolescentes en el Código Civil y Comer-
cial, LA LEY 1, 1 (Apr. 13, 2015). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Julio César Rivera, Aplicación del Código Civil y Comercial a las rela-
ciones preexistentes y a los procesos judiciales en trámite Algunas propuestas, 
LA LEY 1, 2 (June 17, 2015). 
 22. Oscar E. Garay, Protección de la persona y temas de la salud en el Có-
digo Civil y Comercial, LA LEY 1, 1 (Nov. 17, 2014). 




Three more tenets may be grouped together and derive from the 
constitutionalization of private law. One tenet refers to a code of 
equality. Again, the central place in codification is now occupied by 
the human being who must be treated equally.23 Equality does not 
distinguish according to sex, religion, place of origin, or wealth:24 it 
has a universal dimension in the ACCC.25 Two other tenets refer to 
a code that is based on a non-discriminatory paradigm, and to a code 
of individual rights and of rights with a collective impact (incidencia 
colectiva). The non-discriminatory text addresses both types of 
rights according to the Argentine Constitution.26 The drafters men-
tion that most codes only regulate individual rights. However, the 
ACCC gives significant importance to rights with a collective im-
pact (e.g., the right to a healthy environment, the right to non-dis-
crimination), keeping them in line with the Argentine Constitu-
tion.27 Individual rights and rights with a collective impact are both 
explicitly mentioned in the ACCC.28 The spread of a variety of dan-
gers and their diffuse or collective character justifies the inclusion 
of rights with a collective impact.29  
Another tenet focusses on pillars of private law that intermingle 
with public law. That tenet relates to a code with a new paradigm of 
family law and of property law.30 On the one hand, in the law of 
family, it is possible to sense that family relations experienced the 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 9. 
 26. It should be noted, however, that some scholars claim that this tenet is not 
fully present when dealing with the rights of Native Americans. See Pamela Cac-
ciavillani, ¿Un código para una sociedad multicultural? Algunas reflexiones his-
tórico-jurídicas sobre el proceso de unificación de los códigos civil y comercial 
en Argentina, 9 REVISTA ELECTRÓNICA DEL INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES 
“AMBROSIO L. GIOJA” 25, 32 (2015). 
 27. See arts. 41, 43, Const. Nacional. 
 28. Law 26994, art. 14. See Lidia M. R. Garrido Cordobera, Derechos indi-
viduales y de incidencia colectiva en el Código Civil y Comercial, LA LEY 1, 6 
(Feb. 10, 2015). 
 29. Garrido Cordobera, supra note 28, at 6. 
 30. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 5. 




constitutionalization of private law.31 Family relations preserve in 
Argentina their importance as a social institution and strengthen the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination recognized at a consti-
tutional and international level.32 On the other hand, in the law of 
property, the Argentine Civil Code of 1871 had followed the Code 
Napoléon conception, and welcomed the liberal paradigm of prop-
erty.33 As other nineteenth-century texts, the Argentine code had 
embraced the liberal ideal of an absolute, unique, and perpetual real 
right of ownership.34 A broader scope was proposed in the 2015 text 
for this pillar of private law, aiming to a reconciliation with consti-
tutional law and human rights.35 It is possible to note that in Argen-
tina the ACCC welcomes both the unification of civil and commer-
cial laws and the interplay of constitutional principles and their op-
erationalization through private law.36 
III. FAMILY LAW  
The ACCC is tightly related to the Argentine Constitution, 
where civil law becomes a reflection of a number of constitutional 
principles.37 This relation between a private law code and the con-
stitution was pointed early in the nineteenth century, as expressed 
by the ideas of Juan Bautista Alberdi; yet, the relationship lost 
 
 31. Carla Modi, El derecho real de habitación del cónyuge/conviviente su-
pérstite, ED-DCCLXXVII-929 1, 1-2 (June 10, 2019). 
 32. For an analysis on how the principle of equality—as incorporated into the 
family law provisions of the ACCC—addresses all sectors of Argentine society, 
see Julio César Rivera, La proyectada recodificación del derecho de familia, 4 
REVISTA DE DERECHO DE FAMILIA Y DE LAS PERSONAS 3 (2012).  
 33. Abelardo Levaggi, El proceso de transformación del régimen de la pro-
piedad según la codificación iberoamericana del siglo XIX, in V Actas do XII 
Congresso Internacional de AHILA 413, 417 (Eugénio dos Santos ed. 2001). 
 34. Id. at 416-419; MANUEL I. ADROGUÉ, EL DERECHO DE PROPIEDAD EN LA 
ACTUALIDAD: INTRODUCCIÓN A SUS NUEVAS EXPRESIONES 36 (Abeledo-Perrot 
1991). 
 35. 1 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN COMENTADO 26-27 (Julio 
César Rivera & Graciela Medina eds., La Ley 2014) [hereinafter, RIVERA & ME-
DINA, 1 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO]. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 59; and RIVERA & ME-
DINA, 1 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 35, at 26-27. 




strength during the twentieth century.38 Jurists of the current century 
revived the relationship, focusing on the interaction between consti-
tutional principles and the ACCC. They acknowledge that the con-
stitution provides the main principles under which a nation is built 
and look at codes as tools to materialize such principles.39   
In family relations the division between private and public law 
becomes blurry. After all, families play a fundamental role as a so-
cial institution; and the more legislators focus on preserving the 
equality of all members of society and on protecting the principle of 
non-discrimination, the more private and public law become coop-
erative and complementary.40 The Codifying Commission indeed 
gave preeminence to a code with express principles that represent a 
multicultural society;41 and, as indicated in the exposé des motifs, 
the ACCC represents a “democratization of the family,”42 recogniz-
ing the different types of families that individuals may form.43 Fam-
ily relations in the ACCC are hence defined by the current culture 
of the Argentine society and not by a natural principle.44  
 
 38. RIVERA & MEDINA, 1 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra 
note 35, at 26-27. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN COMENTADO 567-571 (Ri-
cardo Luis Lorenzetti ed. 2015) [hereinafter, LORENZETTI, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y CO-
MERCIAL COMENTADO].  
 41. See Parise, supra note 1, at 654-655; referring to Ricardo L. Lorenzetti, 
Proyecto de Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación 5 (2011), available at 
https://perma.cc/4VSB-34SD; and Aída Kemelmajer de Carlucci, Las nuevas 
realidades familiares en el Código Civil y Comercial argentino de 2014, LA LEY 
1, 2 (Oct. 8, 2014).  
 42. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 60. 
 43. Marisa Herrera, Panorama general del derecho de las familias en el Có-
digo Civil y Comercial. Reformar para transformar, LA LEY SUPLEMENTO ESPE-
CIAL NUEVO CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL 2014, 39 (Nov. 17, 2014). 
 For a critical note on how the “democratization of the family” in the ACCC 
fails to recognize and protect vulnerable parties in family relations, see Ursula C. 
Basset, El abuso en las relaciones de familia, ED-DCCLXIII-778 1 (Mar. 3, 
2019). 
 44. Kemelmajer de Carlucci, supra note 41, at 1.  
 This current approach also affected the understanding of damages within fa-
mily relations, see Úrsula C. Basset, Admisibilidad de los daños en las relaciones 
de familia: De la inmunidad a la postfamilia, ED-DCCLXXVII-479 1 (June 1, 
2018).  




Drafters of the ACCC aimed to preserve equality amongst all 
members of society and to protect the principle of non-discrimina-
tion when addressing family relations. The ACCC considers family 
as an institution defined by culture, which is in line with article 14 
bis of the Argentine Constitution.45 The latter article considers fam-
ily as an institution independent from the formal act of marriage.46 
Furthermore, the approach to family relations taken by the ACCC 
represents the views adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, which recognizes family as an institution that can take dif-
ferent forms.47 Hence, the approach to family relations democratizes 
the concept of family and uses public law to give grounds to its foun-
dational principles. The cooperation and complementarity of private 
and public law is therefore palpable in the ACCC. 
A. Public Law Principles in Family Relations  
The ACCC deals with family relations in Book II. That book 
incorporates fundamental principles such as freedom, equality, and 
non-discrimination that are relevant to family relations and that can 
be traced to public law. These fundamental principles can be found, 
for example, in the Argentine Constitution. There, article 19 points 
 
 For a critical note on the individualistic approach that the ACCC takes on the 
family as a social institution, see Eduardo José Cárdenas, La familia en el Proy-
ecto de Código Civil, LA LEY 1 (Aug. 15, 2012). 
 45. See art.14 bis, Const. Nacional: it reads in its relevant part, in an English 
translation: 
The State shall grant the benefits of social security, which shall be of an 
integral nature and may not be waived. In particular, the laws shall es-
tablish: compulsory social insurance, which shall be in charge of national 
or provincial entities with financial and economic autonomy, adminis-
tered by the interested parties with State participation, with no overlap-
ping of contributions; adjustable retirements and pensions; full family 
protection; protection of homestead; family allowances and access to a 
worthy housing (emphasis added). 
 46. GELLI, supra note 4, at 129; and Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra 
note 10, at 59-60. 
 47. Kemelmajer de Carlucci, supra note 41, at 2; and Silvana Ballarin, Las 
relaciones de familia: ¿árbol o rizoma?, 96 DERECHO DE FAMILIA: REVISTA IN-
TERDISCIPLINARIA DE DOCTRINA Y JURISPRUDENCIA 3 (2020). 




to freedom and equality,48 while article 75(22) welcomes different 
international instruments that encapsulate those principles.49 Exam-
ples are found in the incorporation of the American Convention on 
Human Rights of 196950 and in the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979.51 At an in-
ternal level, Law 26618 of 201052 also serves as a precedent for the 
ACCC, since it deals with same-sex marriage and the fundamental 
principles that surround that paradigmatic change in family law.53 
The fundamental principles are used as a guideline to understand the 
spirit of the ACCC, and may assist judges at the time of rendering 
justice.54 Further, they create an international responsibility for sig-
natory countries, since, for example, the Inter-American Court of 
 
 48. Art. 19, Const. Nacional reads in an English translation: 
The private actions of men which in no way offend public order or mo-
rality, nor injure a third party, are only reserved to God and are exempted 
from the authority of judges. No inhabitant of the Nation shall be obliged 
to perform what the law does not demand nor deprived of what it does 
not prohibit. 
 49. See supra note 3, and accompanying text. 
 50. Art. 1(1), American Convention on Human Rights reads in its relevant 
part: 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and 
freedoms . . . and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the 
free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrim-
ination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any 
other social condition. 
American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,” available 
at https://perma.cc/5XWH-EUS4. 
 51. Art. 16, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women reads in its relevant part: “1. States Parties shall take all appropri-
ate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to 
marriage and family relations. . . .”, available at https://perma.cc/6KZE-M5Z5.  
 52. LORENZETTI, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 40, 
at 567-571; and 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN COMENTADO 1-3 
(Marisa Herrera et al. eds. 2015) [hereinafter, HERRERA ET AL., 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y 
COMERCIAL COMENTADO]. 
 53. For a description of how same-sex marriage was incorporated in the 
ACCC, see Marotta & Parise, supra note 1, at 250-257. For a reflection on the 
developments of how same-sex marriage was incorporated in Argentine legisla-
tion, see Ursula C. Basseta, How the Battle to Redefine Marriage affected Family 
Law in Argentina, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 529 (2013). 
 54. LORENZETTI, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 40, 
at 568. 




Human Rights could hold Argentina accountable for a violation of 
the principle of equality.55  
The incorporation of fundamental principles is in line with the 
constitutionalization of private law. On the one hand, the principles 
of freedom and equality in family relations are present in article 401 
of the ACCC. This article reads in an English translation: 
This code does not recognize agreements of future marriage. 
There shall be no action to demand performance of a promise 
of marriage or to claim for damages caused by the end of the 
relationship, without prejudice to the application of the rules 
of enrichment without cause, or the restitution of donations, 
if applicable.56 
This article of the ACCC, accordingly, reinforces the prevalence 
of the constitutional principles of freedom by the time of the con-
summation of marriage. It further ensures that that freedom cannot 
be conditioned by prior agreements.57 On the other hand, the princi-
ples of non-discrimination and equality are confirmed in article 402 
of the ACCC. That article prescribes that: 
No rule can be interpreted or applied in the sense of limiting, 
restricting, excluding, or suppressing the equal rights and ob-
ligations of the parties to a marriage; and the effects the mar-
riage produces, be it between two people of the same or dif-
ferent sex.58 
 
 55. Id. at 567-571, and its reference to the cases Atala Rifo v. Chile and For-
nerón v. Argentina.  
 56. Law 26994, art. 401 (emphasis added). 
 57. LORENZETTI, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 40, 
at 565. 
 Scholars in Argentina, however, indicate that this article is detrimental for the 
constitutional “no-damage” value premises as recognized in art. 19 of the Argen-
tine Constitution, since it does not allow parties to claim for the compensation of 
damages. 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN COMENTADO 4-5 (Julio 
César Rivera & Graciela Medina eds. 2014) [hereinafter, RIVERA & MEDINA, 2 
CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO]. 
 58. Law 26994, art. 402 (emphasis added). 




This article, accordingly, states that no provision of the ACCC 
may limit the equality of the rights and obligations of the couple.59 
The principle of non-discrimination, as addressed in the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, is embedded in the text of articles 401 and 402 of the 
ACCC.60 All the above mentioned principles serve as examples of 
the limitations in the intervention of the State to decide on the pri-
vate sphere, as long as society is not negatively affected.61 Ulti-
mately, the ACCC follows an approach to the fundamental princi-
ples that derives from public (national and international) law and 
private law.  
A final note relates to the law of procedure as to family matters, 
since the ACCC includes—along similar lines than the Argentine 
Civil Code of 1871, yet in a more significant number—provisions 
that deal with that part of the law.62 As expected, substantive re-
forms in private law necessarily had an impact on procedure.63 For 
example, the new text states the standards it protects, subscribing to 
what Ricardo Lorenzetti refers to as the incorporation of a “consti-
tutional procedural law of the family” (derecho procesal constituci-
onal de la familia).64 The ACCC emphasizes access to justice and 
dispute resolution for conflicts among family members.65 The new 
 
 59. LORENZETTI, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 40, 
at 567-571; and RIVERA & MEDINA, 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, 
supra note 57, at 5-6. 
 60. HERRERA ET AL., 2 CÓDIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL COMENTADO, supra note 
52, at 1-5. 
 61. Fundamentos del Anteproyecto, supra note 10, at 60; and GELLI, supra 
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text therefore addresses procedure within family law aiming at pro-
tecting constitutional standards of those involved in family con-
flicts.66 The procedure provides further guidance to family judges to 
perform their duties and reinforces and ensures the possibility of 
parties to exercise their family rights.67  
B. Access to Justice in Family Relations 
The term “rights” in Spanish (i.e., derechos) derives from the 
Latin directus, which also means “straight.”68 Legal scholars have 
associated “rights” with the image of a “straight” path that connects 
a problem with a solution.69 The positivistic understanding of the 
function of rights is far from expressing what actually happens, 
though it serves as a reminder that rights are meant to serve as a tool 
to simplify access to a remedy (access to justice). This goal is shared 
by private and public law, though with a different focus: access to 
remedies for private parties, and access to remedies for the public 
good. The adoption of article 706 of the ACCC serves as a prime 
example of how private and public law interact in Argentina.70  
Access to justice—even beyond Argentina—is currently under-
stood in a holistic and inclusive way.71 The term considers the draft-
ing and the administration of the law important, together with the 
welcoming of other disciplines beyond the law to achieve conflict 
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resolution. A clear expansion of the term “access to justice” is ob-
served and boundaries are broadened in view of protecting the ulti-
mate goal of access to justice: conflict resolution and societal order. 
The incorporation of human rights treaties in Argentina plays a sig-
nificant role in broadening the right to access to justice and in ad-
dressing equality by introducing principles considering particulari-
ties of individuals and especially of vulnerable groups.  
The concept of access to justice recognizes the value of law, 
courts, and judges when searching for conflict resolution and socie-
tal order. It further gives value to international law and constitu-
tional principles, to multidisciplinary assistance, and to the active 
participation of all parties involved. This understanding preserves a 
legal-empowerment approach to access to justice that positions the 
capabilities of individuals at the center, recognizing their capacities 
to exercise themselves. Hence, private rights apply to individuals in 
an egalitarian way, without distinctions based on constructed iden-
tities, such as gender, religion, place of birth, or wealth.72  
Article 706 of the ACCC places access to justice as a central 
goal of the law of procedure as to family matters, directly referring 
to access to justice for vulnerable groups.73 That article, being the 
main provision for that part of the ACCC, states in its relevant part 
that: 
  Proceedings in family matters should observe the princi-
ples of effective judicial protection, procedural immediacy, 
good faith and procedural fairness, intervention by the judge 
at his/her own initiative when required, oral proceeding, and 
limited access [only for parties] to the case file. 
  The rules governing the procedure must be applied to fa-
cilitate access to justice, especially for vulnerable people, 
and to achieve peaceful resolution of conflicts.  
  Judges before whom these cases must be filed should be 
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specialized and have multidisciplinary support. . . .74 
There is merit in undertaking a more detailed analysis of that 
seminal provision.75 Article 706 incorporates the underlying consti-
tutional and international principles of equality and due process. 
That incorporation is primarily evident in the adoption of references 
to “effective judicial protection” and “procedural immediacy.” First, 
the reference to “effective judicial protection,” which is about the 
right of a person to be heard by a judge that is independent, impar-
tial, and appointed by law before the act for which he/she is to be 
tried.76 This is in line with article 18 of the Argentine Constitution77 
and with articles 8 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948.78 Further, the reference to “effective judicial protec-
tion” represents the contents of articles 8 and 25 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights,79 since the latter articles address the 
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role of judges to ensure a fair trial and the right to judicial protec-
tion.80 Here, once more, the presence of public law is noticed. 
The reference to “procedural immediacy” in article 706 is also 
important. It can be deemed essential in family proceedings due to 
the characteristics of the conflicts in which a delayed involvement 
of judges could be detrimental for the possibility to solve conflicts 
(or avoid their escalation).81 “Procedural immediacy” can be found 
in a number of international instruments. For example, it is present 
in article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights,82 in arti-
cle 9 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989,83 and in 
articles 1, 3, and 13 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities of 2007.84  
 
1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other 
effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against 
acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or 
laws of the state concerned or by this Convention. . . .  
2. The States Parties undertake: a. to ensure that any person claiming 
such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority 
provided for by the legal system of the state; b. to develop the possibili-
ties of judicial remedy; and c. to ensure that the competent authorities 
shall enforce such remedies when granted. 
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procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the 
child. . . .  
2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all 
interested parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the pro-
ceedings and make their views known. 
 84. Art. 1, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, available 
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present Convention is to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabili-
ties. . . .” Art. 3 of this same instrument reads in its relevant part:  
The principles of the present Convention shall be:  
1. Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy . . ., and independ-
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Article 706 also makes reference to the intervention of the judge 
at his/her own motion, which is further addressed in article 709.85 
This incorporation provides family judges with the procedural ca-
pacity to move the case forward when the parties fail to do so. Fam-
ily judges are called on by the ACCC to take an active role in the 
proceeding.86 Hence, family judges are viewed as fundamental so-
cial actors in the conflict who are given the possibility to participate 
in the proceeding in view of protecting the public interest.87 After 
all, the State must be involved in safeguarding the family as a social 
institution since it encompasses one of its main interests.88 Article 
706(b) further refers to the need of family judges to be specialized 
in that area of the law and to have multidisciplinary support.89 The 
inclusion of public law elements within the ACCC requires family 
 
4. Respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as 
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judges to be knowledgeable beyond private law, being aware of the 
different interpretations by national and international courts.90 
Article 706(a) addresses vulnerable groups, aiming to reduce so-
cial inequalities and enhance social cohesion.91 Scholars have 
pointed that the Brasilia Regulations Regarding Access to Justice 
for Vulnerable People of 200892 were the inspiration for that refer-
ence to vulnerable groups within the ACCC. They consider that that 
international instrument is to be used when aiming to understand the 
extension of the definition and classification of those groups.93 In 
addition, that instrument has been referred to extensively by family 
law regulations in Argentina.94  
Book II on family relations of the ACCC makes evident the in-
terplay of public and private law. It incorporates principles from 
constitutional, international, and procedural law. Likewise, Book II 
offers articulation between a public law system that defends free-
dom, equality, and non-discrimination, and a private law system of 
family relations that offers adequate protection to the individuals 
that are part of a family. Constitutional, international, and proce-
dural principles are operationalized in that book of the Argentine 
new code, influencing the expertise that is needed from the family 
judges and the international responsibility undertaken by the State 
in protecting those principles.  
IV. PROPERTY LAW 
The law of property in the ACCC offers positive innovations 
when compared with the text of the Argentine Civil Code of 1871. 
The new text adapts the law to social realities that had demanded 
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change for a number of decades, incorporating jurisprudential and 
doctrinal developments.95 The individualistic paradigm was left be-
hind, being now more in accordance with the tenets of the Argentine 
Constitution and special legislation.96 It is therefore possible to 
sense a blurring divide between private and public law. For example, 
as indicated in the exposé des motifs, various non-pecuniary things 
have emerged since the nineteenth century (e.g., genetics) which re-
quire legislative attention.97 Furthermore, the communitarian rights 
of Native Americans are to be acknowledged, especially in Latin 
America, where many of those rights were more fully recognized 
only with the constitutional reforms of the final part of the twentieth 
century.98 Environmental hazards also trigger the constitutionaliza-
tion of private law, since they affect property that is considered col-
lective by the Argentine Constitution and by special legislation, 
hence not deemed restricted to the private domain.99 
The ACCC introduces fundamental aspects of property in its 
Preliminary Title, offering a framework that applies throughout the 
text. Property in the new text was expanded to include the environ-
ment and the human body.100 The nineteenth century text—in line 
with other contemporary codes—had neglected these elements of 
property law. According to the new text, persons can hold individual 
rights on property that is part of their patrimony. Material property 
is referred to as a thing and the same rules apply to energy and nat-
ural forces that can be subject to the service of humankind. Parts of 
the human body have no commercial value and can be disposed of 
freely if having an affective, therapeutic, scientific, humanitarian, or 
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social purpose. Finally, Native Americans have the right to possess 
and own the lands their community traditionally held and others that 
may enable human flourishing, according to the Argentine Consti-
tution.101 
Concepts that are needed to fully understand the extent of prop-
erty law in Argentina are presented in Book I of the ACCC, dealing 
with the general part. Fundamental dichotomies are therefore ad-
dressed at turns in that book. For example, property can be movable 
or immovable, divisible or not subject to fragmentation, principal or 
accessory, consumable or nonconsumable, and fungible or nonfun-
gible.102 It can be noted that the ACCC suppresses the category of 
the so-called “movables or immovables due to their representative 
nature.”103  
Relationships with property are addressed in that same book of 
the ACCC. First, with relation to people. Here, property can fall 
within the public domain (e.g., rivers in their natural beds, streets, 
parks, archaeological sites), can belong to the State (e.g., gold 
mines, non-navigable lakes), or can be privately owned. Second, 
with relation to rights with a collective impact.104 Elements of an 
ecological function of property can be identified in that second rela-
tionship in Argentina. Rights with a collective impact secure the en-
joyment of individual rights; hence, it is worth positioning the for-
mer over the latter.105  
Society at large plays a role in securing the sustainability of the 
environment.106 Owners of property, however, must play a specific 
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role. Sustainability does not fall within the exclusive competence of 
public law. For example, in Europe, the Constitution of Slovenia of 
1991 welcomes the regulation of restrictions to the right of owner-
ship to ensure the economic, social, and ecological function of prop-
erty.107 In the Americas, the Constitution of Colombia states also 
since 1991 that property is limited by an ecological function;108 
while a Brazilian high court understood in 2012 that there are eco-
logical concerns that prevent owners from destroying natural re-
sources that benefit society.109 Similar situations may be faced with 
hydraulic fracturing in South Africa, with gas drilling in the Nether-
lands, with mining in China, or with surface mining in the USA.  
The ecological function of property refers to ownership as ful-
filling an ecological function, with a duty to secure sustainability.110 
Limitations to ownership have proliferated since the final decades 
of the twentieth century because of environmental controls from the 
State.111 It has been correctly stated, already in 2002 by Myrl L. 
Duncan, that “land ownership disconnected from community is a 
logical impossibility.”112 Awareness of the role of humans as crea-
tures in an environment enables reconciliation between ownership 
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and ecology.113 A main challenge of sustainability relates to reach-
ing a development that is grounded in ecology, social equality, cul-
tural diversity, and democratic participation.114  
The ACCC refers that the exercise of individual rights must be 
compatible with rights that have a collective impact, hence not affect 
the sustainability or operation of, amongst others, ecosystems of 
flora, fauna, biodiversity, and water. The new text includes limita-
tions to individual rights over things in order to protect sustainabil-
ity.115 The understanding of property is broader, hence not only fo-
cusing on patrimonial aspects, and open to enjoyment of other mem-
bers of society.116 It should be noted that the collective value of 
property had been addressed by the Argentine Supreme Court al-
ready in 2006, in the Mendoza case,117 in which environmental law 
was determined to rank at the constitutional level. 
A. Power Relationships  
The ACCC refers to power relationships rather than real or pos-
sessory relationships. The use of the term “power relationships”—
not free of criticism118—may be deemed novel, more precise, and 
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not limited to possession. Further, it may help avoid confusions in 
the comparative-law narrative.119 
Possession and detention are the power relationships a subject 
may have with a thing, under the ACCC. In addition, those who use 
the thing due to a relationship of dependence, service, hospitality, or 
hosting are deemed servers of the possession. This additional dis-
tinction refers to a lack of autonomy and aims to enable the extraju-
dicial defense of possession, enabling that those who have the thing 
are able to protect themselves from the attacks that imply violence 
on the person.120  
Possession occurs when a person exercises a factual power121 
over a thing, acting as the holder of the right, regardless of being 
indeed the holder. The drafters of the ACCC, similarly to the drafter 
of the 1871 text, enrolled in the ideas of Friedrich K. von Savigny, 
according to whom possession requires both corpus and animus.122 
Detention occurs when a person exercises a factual power over a 
thing, acting as a representative of the possessor. Hence, only corpus 
is present in this second power relationship.123 
Possession is presumed when factual power exists, while power 
relationships are presumed to be legitimate and to start on the date 
of the title, within its limitations. A rebuttable presumption points to 
the start of possession on the date indicated in the just title (justo 
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título) or on the date of recordation, if constitutive in nature. Posses-
sion and detention rest on the thing determined, and may be exer-
cised by one or multiple persons on the entirety or part of the thing. 
Subjects of power relationships act in good faith when facing an ex-
cusable and essential error that persuades them on their legitimacy. 
Good faith is—as a general rule—a rebuttable presumption, and it 
is determined at the time the power relationship starts and remains 
unaltered until a new acquisition occurs. Bad-faith possession is il-
legitimate if: (i) dealing with movables, when acquired by theft, em-
bezzlement, or breach of trust; and (ii) dealing with immovables, 
when acquired by force, breach of trust, or in a surreptitious manner. 
It should be noted that heirs continue the possession of the de-
ceased.124  
There are further elements that characterize power relationships. 
For example, these relationships are affected by a rebuttable pre-
sumption of legitimacy, and must be acquired voluntarily by a capa-
ble person (except for minors, who must be ten years of age) or by 
means of contact with or custody of the thing. Power relationships—
as a general rule—require tradition; hence, the delivery of the thing 
from one subject to another who is willing to receive the thing. Fur-
ther, tradition of movables also includes transfer of, amongst others, 
knowledge according to the standard practices when there is no op-
position. Things should be free from other power relationships that 
might demand exclusion and should be free from opposition. Power 
relationships are preserved until they are extinguished and there is a 
presumption on their continuity through time. Finally, power rela-
tionships are extinguished when the power over the thing is lost 
(e.g., when the person abandons the thing expressly and voluntar-
ily).125 
Multiple effects can emerge from power relationships. For ex-
ample, subjects involved in power relationships must return the 
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things to those who have the right to claim them back. Further, good-
faith possessors keep the fruits received and the natural fruits that 
were accrued yet not received. Bad-faith possessors must return the 
fruits received and those that due to their fault were not received. 
All possessors must return the products that were obtained from the 
thing. Another effect is triggered by improvements. Accordingly, no 
subjects can claim compensation for improvements of mere mainte-
nance or luxurious in nature. Conversely, they are entitled to claim 
any improvements that were necessary unless if resulting from their 
bad faith and fault.126 
Each power relationship triggers specific effects, likewise. On 
the one hand, possession triggers specific effects. For example, pos-
sessors must pay any taxes and burdens on the thing, and perform 
the obligation of enclosing, unless provided differently by law. On 
the other hand, detention triggers specific effects. For example, 
those exerting detention must preserve the thing, yet they can re-
cover the costs from the possessor.127 
B. Innovation in Real Rights 
Real rights extend through Book IV of the ACCC. A methodo-
logical innovation in the ACCC was the inclusion of a general part 
in the opening of that book, hence addressing principles that are 
common to all real rights (e.g., acquisition, transfer, and extinc-
tion).128 Accordingly, the new text first addresses the general theory 
of these rights, offering a difference when looking at the 1871 text, 
being now in line with other modern codes, and avoiding some un-
necessary repetitions.129 Book IV then deals with the general theory 
of possession and detention, addressing the acquisition, exercise, 
conservation, and extinction, followed by their effects. Further, that 
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book of the ACCC deals with all real rights individually;130 and fi-
nally, it addresses possessory actions. Book IV follows, in general, 
the proposals included in the 1998 draft of a civil and commercial 
code for Argentina, yet it typifies a number of real rights that had 
not been included in that earlier work.131  
It is worth noting that the exposé des motifs of the ACCC refers 
to a real right for Native American communitarian property.132 That 
real right, however, was ultimately removed from the ACCC. Its in-
clusion would have been in line with the tenet that calls for a code 
with a new paradigm of property law. Furthermore, it would have 
offered another example of the constitutionalization of private law, 
because starting in 1994 the rights of Native Americans are recog-
nized in the Argentine Constitution.133 Native American lands are 
addressed in Argentina in Law 23302 of 1985,134 it should be noted. 
That law deals with Native American policy and must be studied in 
conjunction with Law 24071 of 1992135 that incorporates into the 
Argentine framework the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Conven-
tion of 1989 of the International Labour Organization.136 It is worth 
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noting that those efforts took place within a broader regional con-
text, since several national constitutions had started around that time 
to deal with Native American property relations.137 In addition, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alerted that when 
Native American property was not recognized the cultural and spir-
itual development of the groups was affected.138 In a similar vein, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the protection 
of property as regulated in the American Convention on Human 
Rights included the rights of Native American groups within the 
framework of communitarian property.139  
Real rights are defined in a neoclassical140 manner in Book IV 
of the ACCC.141 The 1871 text had not offered a definition of these 
rights, it should be noted. Real rights are the juridical powers—of a 
legal nature—that are enforced directly over the objects, in an au-
tonomous manner and granting to the holders, amongst others, the 
right to follow and the right of preference. The reference to power 
alerts of the real rather than personal nature of these rights. Further, 
the ius persequendi and the ius preferendi are granted to holders of 
real rights.142 The object of these rights is enforced over the totality 
or a material part of the thing, for its entirety or for an undivided 
part. The object can likewise consist of a good specifically referred 
to by law. Real rights are created and regulated only according to 
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law, and the provisions on real rights are substantially of public or-
der.143 Argentina subscribes to the numerus clausus principle,144 and 
judges cannot constitute or impose the constitution of a real right, 
except when provided by law.145  
Book IV of the ACCC indeed preserves the numerus clausus 
principle. The 2015 text welcomes new real rights to the Argentine 
codified system: horizontal ownership (propiedad horizontal),146 
immovable groups per se (conjuntos inmobiliarios),147 timeshar-
ing,148 and private cemeteries.149 These real rights were added to 
those that already existed in the civil code before the adoption of the 
ACCC: ownership,150 co-ownership,151 superficies,152 usufruct,153 
use,154 habitation,155 servitude,156 hypothec,157 antichresis,158 and 
pledge.159 The enactment of the ACCC ended the debate that con-
sidered usufruct, use, and habitation personal servitudes, for every 
time the ACCC clearly considers the three to be autonomous real 
rights.160  
The ACCC incorporates a number of provisions that had origi-
nally been placed outside of codes because of de-codification, and 
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that had eventually gained a place within the civil code. For exam-
ple, the ACCC, as opposed to the original text of 1871, includes the 
real right of superficies. This incorporation reflects the need to use 
the land in a beneficial way, avoiding vacant plots. This adoption 
could be perceived as a limitation to the holders of rights, in benefit 
of others, hence showing the percolation of public law.161 Doctrinal 
efforts had welcomed this right already for a number of decades in 
Argentina, and this right was included in all revision efforts since 
1987.162 The normative reception would, however, take place by 
means of Law 25509 of 2001163 dealing with superficies of forested 
areas, now abrogated by the ACCC.164 
The ACCC—as already mentioned—welcomes new real rights. 
Horizontal ownership moved from Law 13512 of 1948165 into the 
ACCC, showing that the de-codification experience of that right ex-
tended for six decades. It should be noted that this right was not pre-
sent in the 1871 code, having been expressly forbidden by the codi-
fier.166 This right, however, had gained the status of a real right al-
most undisputedly by its reception in doctrinal writings and juris-
prudence, after the enactment of the previously mentioned special 
legislation.167 There was a need to update the legislation that had 
existed almost without alterations for more than half a century, and 
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the ACCC encapsulates the existing provisions, while also including 
copious doctrinal writings and jurisprudential decisions.168 
Other new real rights are included in a specific title associated 
with new forms of property. These forms were a consequence of 
internal migration in Argentina and challenged the traditional ways 
to relate to property.169 The three new real rights are of special in-
terest when attending the blurring line of private and public law; and 
are referred to in the ACCC in an overarching (and ambiguous) man-
ner as “immovable groups.”170 The three rights—it is worth repeat-
ing—are immovable groups per se, timesharing, and private ceme-
teries.  
Immovable groups per se refers to gated communities, industrial 
zones, and any other urban development projects regardless of their 
designated use for permanent or temporary residence or for com-
mercial exploitation.171 The already mentioned Law 13512 had 
started to bridge the legislative gap, helping to regulate these groups, 
and there was a need for specific regulation.172 Limitations to own-
ership and an ecological function of property can be identified when 
attending the powers and obligations of owners in immovable 
groups per se.173 Rights, accordingly, may be enjoyed within limi-
tations that should aim to protect ecological, architectural, and land-
scape values. Further, the horizontal ownership regulations of the 
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group should attend aspects that would be beneficial for the urban-
istic community.174 Likewise, servitudes and other real rights may 
be established if allowing for a better enjoyment of the facilities and 
spaces in common.175 Finally, transfer of units can be limited yet not 
completely forbidden and sanctions can be imposed on those who 
violate the horizontal ownership regulations.176 
Timesharing gained momentum in Argentina in the 1980s. It 
currently finds a place in the ACCC, having had its first regulation 
in Law 26356 of 2008.177 Doctrinal debate accompanied that emer-
gence, exploring whether it should be considered an autonomous 
real right.178 Under the ACCC, this real right exists when one or 
more movable or immovable goods are subject to periodic or in-
turns use for, amongst others, dwelling, commerce, tourism, and in-
dustry, and to offer the functions that are compatible with its pur-
pose.179 Actors have different duties in timesharing;180 and they are 
involved in a consumer relationship to be regulated by the specific 
provisions of the ACCC and special legislation, needing to comply 
likewise with national, provincial, and municipal regulations.181 
This aspect points to the constitutionalization of private law, since 
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the general interest, also in the sphere of public law, is attended in 
the new text.182  
Private cemeteries are regulated as a real right in the ACCC. 
Cemeteries originally were annexed to the Church and then to the 
administration of the State, mainly by regulations of administrative 
law. More recently, private cemeteries started to develop, offering 
an alternative to the public grounds.183 This real right encompasses 
the immovables of private ownership that are connected to the burial 
of human remains. The municipality must approve the operation of 
these cemeteries and that approval will prevent the use of the prop-
erty for other purposes.184  
Innovation in real rights points to a blurring divide between pri-
vate and public law in Argentina, safeguarding, amongst others, the 
right to freedom and non-discrimination of people and highlighting 
the role of property for all members of society. The ACCC wel-
comes changes that had found a place within the legal framework 
by means of de-codification and that responded to the needs of the 
current Argentine society.  
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Argentina adopted a much-awaited civil and commercial code 
in 2015. A study of that new text assisted in visualizing the interac-
tion of private and public law, showing that it is not adequate to 
speak of public and private law as watertight compartments: they 
intermingle. The results of the interaction between public and pri-
vate in Argentina should be of benefit for members of society, when 
a plethora of rights can be protected and exercised.  
This report first introduced the ACCC. It therefore pointed to the 
tenets that the members of the Codifying Commission extracted 
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from the new text, welcoming the constitutionalization of private 
law. The report then looked at family law, more precisely at family 
relations. There readers were directed to the presence of public law 
principles within that area of private law, while they were also in-
troduced to the framework that the new text offers in its effort to 
secure access to justice for all. After all, families play a fundamental 
role as a social institution within a code that is aimed at a multicul-
tural society. Finally, the report focused on property law, which is 
unquestionably one of the pillars of private law. There, attention was 
devoted to the power relationships that emerge when persons inter-
act with things. In that section the report also alerted about the inno-
vative approach that the Argentine codifiers took in the area of real 
rights. 
The interconnection between public and private law can assist in 
achieving societal goals. Intermingling can be deemed positive in 
Argentina, since it is now evident that overarching principles and 
values that were traditionally considered as belonging to public law 
have been introduced into the main body of private law. The con-
tents of the new text calls for a renewed approach by courts, practi-
tioners, and member of society at large. Actors in Argentina will 
have to look at this seminal text of private law also through the prism 
of public law.  
 
